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We construct a family model of labor supply that features adjustment along both the in-
tensive and extensive margin. Intensive margin adjustment is restricted to two values: full
time work and part-time work. Using simulated data from the steady state of the calibrated
model, we examine whether standard labor supply regressions can uncover the true value of
the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply parameter. We nd positive estimated elastic-
ities that are larger for women and that are highly signicant, but they bear virtually no
relationship to the underlying preference parameters.
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The value of  is critical for many economic analyses. One common strategy for uncovering
the value of  is to carry out structural estimation on micro panel data. One general issue
in structural estimation exercises using micro data is that misspecication of the constraints
that individuals face is likely to inuence inference about preference parameters. In one popu-
lar specication of the constraints faced by individuals{the canonical model of life cycle labor
supply{individuals can vary their hours continuously, face a wage per unit of time that is inde-
pendent of hours worked and are subject to a present value budget constraint. In this setting,
Thomas E. MaCurdy (1981) and Joseph G. Altonji (1986) show how simple linear regressions
can be used to estimate the value of . At the other extreme, many aggregate models (e.g.,
Gary D. Hansen (1985) and Richard Rogerson (1988)) assume that workers face a binary choice
with regard to working: they can either work a xed amount that corresponds to full time work,
or they can not work. In this setting, the key regression coecient from either the MaCurdy or
Altonji specications will always be zero but does not provide any information about the value
of .1
While both of these two extreme cases capture some elements of reality in terms of the
choices that individuals face, it seems reasonable to think that reality probably lies in between
the two extreme cases.2 In this paper we consider one empirically appealing intermediate case
in which individuals who decide to participate in the labor market can choose between full-time
work and part-time work. We build and calibrate such a model and use it to generate micro
panel data. We then ask whether standard labor supply regressions typically justied by the
assumption of a continuous hours choice and a linear earnings schedule will uncover the true
value of . As this model allows for some choice along the intensive margin, it is not clear a
priori what to expect.3
1Alternative specications that are of particular interest include allowing for human capital accumulation
(Susumu Imai and Michael P. Keane (2004)), borrowing constraints (David Domeij and Martin Floden (2006)),
non-linear wage schedules (Eric French (2005) and Rogerson and Johanna Wallenius (2009)), or optimization
frictions (Raj Chetty (2010)).
2See Rogerson (forthcoming) for a review of the literature on hours constraints.
3One may ask whether it is of interest to estimate the parameter  in a model that features discrete choice.
As argued in both Rogerson (forthcoming) and Chetty et al. (forthcoming), if the discrete choices are dictated
by the need to coordinate, then the values of these choices will respond to changes in the aggregate economic
environment, and in this case the curvature parameter will play a key role.
2Because the prevalence of part-time work in reality varies signicantly across males and
females, and since the results may be sensitive to the frequency of part-time work, we consider
a model that features both male and female labor supply. Additionally, since most labor supply
takes place in multi-member households, we model households as consisting of two members and
consider the joint labor supply problem of the household in a dynamic setting. The resulting
model is essentially the family labor supply model of Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim (2006),
extended to allow for part-time work.
In contrast to what one would nd if full time work and no work were the only options,
we nd that standard labor supply regressions on individual panel data do generate non-zero
estimates for labor supply elasticities. However, the estimated values are virtually unrelated to
the underlying preference parameter that the methods are designed to uncover. Moreover, the
estimates are higher for women than for men, even if the underlying preference parameters are
identical. We conclude that standard methods do not correctly identify individual preference
parameters in our model featuring a mix of adjustment along the intensive and extensive margins.
While we focus on one specic economy, our results point to the importance of properly modeling
the choices of hours and earning schedules that individuals actually face and using methods that
can uncover the underlying preference parameters given the nature of these choice sets.
Several papers in the literature have discussed the issue of estimating individual preference
parameters if workers are not free to choose hours, or more generally can choose among hours
and wage bundles. Je E. Biddle (1988) argues for using standard labor supply methods but on
a sample that is restricted to self-employed workers that are free to adjust hours. In addition to
possible selection biases, a shortcoming of this approach is that self-employed workers are likely
to face stochastic employment opportunities as opposed to being able to choose hours at a xed
wage. Altonji and Christina H. Paxson (1988, 1992), French (2005) and Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009) consider the case in which workers face a continuous hours choice but face a wage that is
contingent on hours. Chetty et al. (forthcoming) consider a model in which each rm oers a
xed workweek and search frictions prevent workers from being able to instantaneously adjust
hours of work by switching to another rm.4 Our paper is the rst to explore the performance
of standard labor supply methods in a context that features multiple but discrete choices for
hours of work and tied hours-wage bundles.
4See the discussion in Rogerson (forthcoming) for additional references to the literature.
3I. The Model
There is a continuum of measure one of ex-ante identical households, each consisting of one male
and one female member. We assume a unitary household that has preferences over streams of

















where ct is household consumption, hmt is hours of market work by the male member and hft
is hours of work by the female member. There are only three possible choices for hours of
market work by an individual: full time work, denoted by hF, part time work, denoted by hP,
or zero. Individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that aect their productivity in market
work. Letting xit, i = m, f denote the idiosyncratic productivity for male and female household
members respectively, we assume:
logx0
it+1 = (1   i)log  xi + i logxit + it; it  N(0;2
i) (2)
The innovations for these markov processes are i.i.d. across individuals, households, and time.
We assume that there is a wage penalty associated with part-time work. Additionally, to
capture the fact that men and women have dierential labor supply across occupations and
that this penalty may dier across occupations, we allow the penalty to be gender specic. In
particular, if wt is the wage rate per unit of labor services in period t, and an individual of
gender i has idiosyncratic productivity xit, then he or she receives labor earnings of xitwthF
if working full time and (1   i)xitwthP if working part time. It follows that the wage rate
per hour of market work that an individual of gender i faces is a function of both his or her
own idiosyncratic productivity shock and choice of work hours. We denote this by ~ wit(xit;hit).
There are no markets for insurance against idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and the only asset
available to households is claims to physical capital. Letting at denote the capital that the
household carries into period t, and rt the rate of return on capital net of depreciation, the one
period budget constraint faced by the household is given by:
at+1 = ~ wmt(xmt;hmt)hmt + ~ wft(xft;hft)hft + (1 + rt)at   ct;
We assume that capital holdings cannot go below zero, i.e., at  0 for all t.
4A representative rm produces output according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas
technology in capital (Kt) and eciency units of labor (Lt): Yt = K
t L1 
t .. Capital depreciates
at rate .
We focus on a steady state equilibrium in which the aggregates Kt and Lt as well as the two
prices rt and wt are constant. The household's optimization problem can be conveniently re-
formulated in the recursive form. The individual state variable for a household will be the triplet
(a;xm;xf). Let Vjk(a;xm;xf) denote the value to a household when the male member's labor
market state is j and the female member's is k. Due to indivisibility of labor as assumed above,
j; k 2 fF;P;Ng where F stands for full-time work, P part-time work and N not-working. Hence
a household has nine types of value functions associated with its two members' labor market
states. For example, the value to a household in which both male and female members work full



















f hF + (1 + r)a   a0; and a0  0:
Other value functions, VFP, VFN, VPF, VPP, VPN, VNF, VNP, VNN, are dened in a similar
way. Dropping the arguments of the value functions for notational convenience, a household's
joint decision for labor supply can be characterized as:






We set a time period equal to one year. As shown in Chang and Kim (2006), some interesting
implications arise when allowing for a shorter time period and then time aggregating to generate
panel data at annual frequency. Because we want to focus on dierent issues, we set a time period
equal to one year and thereby abstract from these time aggregation eects.
Our main goal is to assess how the relationship between the preference parameters m and f
and the estimates from standard labor supply regressions is aected by the presence of restricted
hours choices. For this reason we will consider ve dierent economies that dier in their values
for these two labor preference parameters. For simplicity we will consider the symmetric case in
which the two parameters are the same, and denote the common value by . The ve economies
5that we consider correspond to  = :2, :4, :6, :8, and 1:0. Given these assumed values for , the
rest of the model's parameters will be calibrated as follows.
There are many papers in the literature that estimate idiosyncratic wage and/or earnings
shocks, though almost exclusively for prime aged males that are employed full time. The con-
sensus from this literature is that wage shocks are very persistent and large. For our benchmark
analysis we again impose symmetry and use the same values for both male and female workers:
i = :92 and i = :21 for i = m, f. This particular choice corresponds to the estimates of Floden
and Jesper Linde (2001) for prime aged males. The value of  xm is set to zero as a normalization,
while  xf is set so that the unconditional average productivity for females is 35% less than that
of males.5
The labor share, , is set to :64, and the annual depreciation rate, , is set to :08. The
discount factor  is chosen so that in steady state we have r = :05. At work, individuals supply
h = 0:4 and h = 0:2, as a full-time and part-time worker, respectively.
This leaves four parameters: the two utility parameters Bm and Bf, and the two part-time
wage penalty parameters, m and f. For each value of  we choose the values of these param-
eters so as to match four employment targets: the fraction of the male and female population
that are employed full time and part time. This requires taking a stand on how to map hours
of work in the data into the categories of non-employment, part-time and full-time. For our
benchmark results we use the following mapping between annual hours of work and employment
status: annual hours greater than 1800 corresponds to full time work, annual hours between
400 and 1800 corresponds to part time work and annual hours less than 400 corresponds to zero
work. Our results are not much aected by small changes in the values of the cutos. The hours
worked distribution from the data is clearly much more spread out than the three point distri-
bution implied by our model. Adding measurement error to hours in the model could produce a
distribution in the model that would better resemble the one from the data. To the extent that
measurement error in hours generates results that are well-understood, we choose to abstract
from this feature. More generally, whereas we assume that the full and part-time options are the
same for all individuals, it would be reasonable to assume that there is heterogeneity in these
5We incorporate this feature so as to generate a gender wage gap in equilibrium, though this feature plays no
role in our results. Because the preference parameters Bi are allowed to be gender specic, the value of Bf plays
a similar role as  xf in terms of inuencing labor supply. Despite this, it is interesting to note that the model
has some diculties in matching the gender wage gap found in the data. For example, in the equilibrium with
 = :40, the gender wage gap is 25%, but for full-time workers the wage gap is only 7:7%, reecting the presence
of strong selection eects in labor-market participation for females.
6values associated with, for example, occupational dierences.
Based on data from the PSID for the years 1968-2002 for married couples with the age of
the household head between 25 and 55, the target values for the fraction of individuals employed
full time is :891 and :402 for males and females respectively, while the corresponding values for
part time employment are :057 and :226 with the above values of cutos for employment status.6
The required penalty is decreasing in , and ranges from zero to as much as 50%. While
several issues make it dicult to measure this penalty in the data, there is a small literature
that provides some estimates this penalty, including the early contribution of Robert A. Mott
(1984) and more recent papers by Keane and Kenneth I. Wolpin (2001) and Daniel Aaronson
and French (2004). A reasonable upper bound for the size of the penalty seems to be around
20%. All of our specications with the exception of  = :2 are within the reasonable range.
While this might suggest that the  = :2 specication is not reasonable, but we will continue to
consider it below. The model is calibrated so as to exactly match the distribution of both males
and females across the three dierent levels of work. However, the model also does a good job of
capturing the joint distribution of male and female employment status across households, as well
as the year-to-year transition rates for both men and women across the three employment states.
In the interest of space we do not report these results. In summary, our model does a reasonable
job of matching both the distribution of males and females across the three employment states
as well as the transitions among the three states.
Our main goal is to assess how standard methods for estimating labor supply elasticities
based on the assumptions of a continuous choice of working hours and a linear earnings schedule
(i.e., earnings are linear in time devoted to work at a particular point in time) fare in our setting.
Assuming a continuous choice and a linear earnings schedule, our period utility function implies
that the following condition for male and female labor supply must hold in any period in which
hours are positive:
log(1   hit) = A    logwit +  logct
where A is a constant and ct is household consumption in period t.
To begin our analysis we use the steady state equilibrium decision rules to generate a panel
data set consisting of 5000 households with 100 years of observations and then run the above
regression using all observations with positive hours.7 Later on we will consider how various
6Our results are not much aected by small changes in the values of the cutos.
7For the results we report we imposed that the coecients on log wages and log consumption are the same,
though the results are eectively the same if this is not imposed.
7selection criterion inuence the estimates. The results are in Table 1. In running this regression
we impose that the coecients on logwit and logct are equal in absolute value and of opposite
sign, though the estimates are eectively unchanged even if we do not impose this condition.
We do not report standard errors in the table, but note that they are all very close to zero.
Table 1: Estimates of 
 = :2  = :4  = :6  = :8  = 1:0
^ m :10 :09 :09 :09 :09
^ f :25 :34 :37 :37 :38
Several interesting results emerge. First, whereas in a pure indivisible labor model in which
full time work is the sole option for working, one would necessarily nd a zero estimate for
the labor supply elasticity parameter (recall that we abstract from time aggregation eects),
here we obtain positive values for both males and females in all cases. Second, the estimated
preference parameter is always larger for women than for men. Third, the estimated values ^ i
bear essentially no relationship to the true preference parameters. For men we nd that the
estimated value of ^ m is eectively equal to :10 independently of the true value of . A similar
result arises for the estimated preference parameter for women. Although when  = :20 the
estimated value ^ f is substantially lower than for the other cases, for  between :40 and 1:0 we
see that there is relatively little change in ^ f despite a more than doubling of .
While space limitation prevents us from reporting results from many sensitivity studies, we
briey mention three. First, we have examined how sample selection rules inuence the results.
Many studies use selection rules that oversample highly attached workers. Our main results also
apply in this case. While we do nd higher estimated elasticities for low attachment samples, it
remains true that the estimates are virtually unrelated to the true value of . Second, while the
above results assumed a very long panel, in practice researchers often have a much shorter panel.
We have also run the same exercises with a sample panel that lasts for ten years, and obtained
similar results. Third, the above regressions have used the log of leisure as the left hand side
variable, since this is consistent with our specication of preferences. We have also run the same
regressions using log of hours worked as the left hand side variable. The results are eectively
identical, though as expected the estimated values of ^ i are now larger since the labor supply
elasticity of labor supply for hours worked is greater than the labor supply elasticity for leisure.
Specically, based on the 100 year sample, the estimates are roughly :21 and :88 for men and
women respectively.
8Lastly, we report one exercise that captures the properties of aggregate labor supply in our
setting. Specically, motivated by the exercise of Edward C. Prescott (2004), we ask what
happens to aggregate hours worked in steady state if a proportional tax on labor income is
introduced and the proceeds are used to fund a lump-sum transfer. We nd that moving from
a tax rate of zero to 20% results in a decrease in aggregate hours worked of roughly 13% in
all ve economies. Interpreted from the perspective of a stand-in household model with period
household utility function logc B h1+1=
1+1= , this change is consistent with a value of  of roughly
1:6. This is quite similar to the implied value that Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) have found for
models that do not allow for part time work.
III. Conclusion
We built a model of family labor supply in which individuals choose between full-time work,
part-time work and non-employment. The model is calibrated so as to replicate the movements
of both male and female workers among these states. Although the individual labor supply
problem is a discrete choice problem, individuals are able to adjust hours along the intensive
margin by moving between part-time and full-time work. Intuitively, adjustment along the
intensive margin potentially allows one to estimate the true value of the underlying curvature
parameter describing the utility from leisure. We explore the extent to which standard labor
supply methods can achieve this in our setting. Although these methods deliver precise estimates
that are signicantly dierent from zero, the estimates are eectively unrelated to the true
underlying values. These methods also deliver elasticity estimates for women even when the
underlying preference parameters are the same for men and women.
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